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Trademark Law: Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products
Co. - The Supreme Court Upholds Trademark
Protection for a Color
L Introduction
Certainly a trademarkcould not be claimed of a rope, the entire surface of which
was colored; and ifcolor be made the essentialfeature, it should be so defined, or
connected with some symbol or design, that other manufacturers may know what
they may safely do.
Supreme Court Justice Henry Billings Brown'
Justice Brown's declaration embodies the traditional view that color alone is not
capable of trademark protection.2 That is, one seller may not make a product in a
certain color and claim that product in that color as its exclusive trademark property.3
However, in a dramatic departure from tradition, the United States Supreme Court
abandoned this hoary maxim in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.' The
Qualitex case resolved a conflict between the United States courts of appeal. The
Seventh and Ninth Circuits imposed a prohibition against the registration of a color,
while the Eighth and Federal Circuits found no per se prohibition for protection of
a color alone.5 In an increasingly rare unanimous decision, the United States
Supreme Court held that the Lanham Trademark Act 6 "permits the registration of a
trademark that consists, purely and simply, of a color."7
This note first explores the background of color protection within trademark law,
specifically addressing the United States Supreme Court's early treatment of the issue,
requirements for a trademark under the Lanham Act, and the conflicting decisions of
the United States courts of appeal. Second, this note discusses the facts of Qualitex
and the Court's reasons for its holding. Third, the Court's decision to recognize
trademark protection of a color is analyzed and problems with the Supreme Court's
analysis and the practical application of the holding are examined, the note presents
a recommendation that should help prevent a small but significant group of problems
that result from the Qualitex decision.

01. A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 201 U.S. 166, 170-71 (1906).
2. See, e.g., J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
7.16[1l, at 7-66 (3d ed. 1994) (stating traditional view that color alone is not subject to trademark
protection).
3. Id. § 7.16[2), at 7-68.
4. 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995).
5. See discussion infra Part II.C.
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994).
7. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1302.
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II. Background
A. The TraditionalApproach of the Supreme Court
In 1878, the Supreme Court described the common law definition of trademark
rather broadly to "consist of a name, symbol, figure, letter, form, or device, if
adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant in order to designate the goods he
manufactures or sells to distinguish the same from those manufactured or sold by
another."' But as early as 1906, in A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick &
Bascom Rope Co.,9 the Court questioned "whether mere color [could] constitute a
valid trademark."" In dicta, the Court explained, "if color be made the essential
feature, it should be so defined, or connected with some symbol or design, that other
manufacturers may know what they may safely do."'" In other words, the Court
found that a trademark should clearly describe a colored figure so that other
manufacturers will know how to avoid infringement. 2 The Court concluded that "a
trademark which may 3be infringed by a streak of any color, however applied, is
'
manifestly too broad.' 1
In 1920, more than twenty-five years before the passage of the Lanham Act, the
Supreme Court denied trademark protection for the brown color of a beverage. In
Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co., 4 the Supreme Court held that "[t]he product including
the coloring matter is free to all who can make it if no extrinsic deceiving element
is present."'5 Applying these cases, lower courts historically have denied trademark
protection for color alone. 6
B. The Lanham TrademarkAct
The Act of July 8, 1870," the first federal trademark statute, created few
substantive rights for trademark protection. 8 That statute merely provided for the
registration of marls already protected under common law. 9 However, in 1946,
Congress passed the Lanham Trademark Act, which greatly expanded trademark

8. McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 254 (1877).
9. 201 U.S. 166 (1906).
10. L at 171.
11. Id The plaintiff claimed a trademark in wire rope with one strand a different color than the rest.
Id. at 172.
12. Id. at 171.
13. Id
14. 254 U.S. 143 (1920).
15. Id at 147.
16. See, e.g., Life Savers Corp. v. Curtiss Candy Co., 182 F.2d 4, 9 (7th Cir. 1950) (denying
exclusive use of multicolored stripes on packaging because color cannot be monopolized to distinguish
a product); Campbell Soap Co. v. Armour & Co., 175 F.2d 795, 798 (3d Cir. 1949) (denying exclusive
use of half red and half white labels because one cannot acquire a trademark in color alone).
17. Act of July 8,1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198.
18. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES 200-01
(3d ed. 1993).
19. Id.
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protection z Some of the principal purposes of the Lanham Act were to modernize
trademark law, facilitate commerce, and protecting consumers.2' Under the Lanham
Act, Congress defined a trademark as including "any word, name, symbol or service,
or any combination thereof."'
Generally, three elements must be present for a word or symbol to function as a
trademark: (1) a tangible symbol - a word, name, symbol, device, or any combination of these; (2) use of the symbol - actual adoption and use of the symbol as
a mark by a manufacturer or seller of goods or services in commerce; and (3)
function - to identify and distinguish the seller's goods from goods made or sold by
another manufacturer.' In determining what can qualify as a trademark, it is crucial
that the symbol be so distinctive as to identify and distinguish the source of the
goods from that of another manufacturer, as embodied by the third element.'
Symbols which are inherently nondistinctive - that is, they are not capable in and
of themselves of distinguishing the source of the product - require proof that the
mark has become distinctive.' When a mark becomes distinctive, it acquires a
"secondary meaning. '
The keystone of trademark protection is the avoidance of the "likelihood of
confusion" in the minds of the buying public z To determine the likelihood of
confusion, courts weigh a number of factors.? These factors include: (1) the
strength of plaintiffs mark; (2) the degree of similarity between plaintiffs and
defendant's marks; (3) the proximity of the products or services; (4) the likelihood
plaintiff will enter defendant's market; (5) evidence of actual confusion; (6)
defendant's good faith in adopting the mark; (7) the quality of defendant's product or
service; and (8) the sophistication of the buyers. 9 Based on an evaluation of these
factors, if a court concludes that a product's trademark is likely to confuse consumers
as to its manufacturing source, the court will find infringement."
In addition to expressly allowing a trademark infringement action in section 2, the
Lanham Act provides for a claim of unfair competition.3' Under section 43(a),

20. Lanham Trademark Act, ch. 540,60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 10511127 (1994)).
21. In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994).
23. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 3.01[1], at 3-2.
24. Id.
25. Id. § 15.01[l], at 15-4.
26. Id. § 15.01[1], at 15-5.
27. Id. § 2.03, at 2-16.
28. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
29. Id. at 495.
30. See, e.g., Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1978).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994). The Act provides:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container
for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description or
fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation,
connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin,
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unfair competition embraces a broad range of competitive conduct likely to confuse

consumers. 32 Thus, an unfair competition claim may take many different forms

including infringement of "trade dress. 33 The trade dress of a product is its overall
image as the manufacturer presents it to the consumer, including the size, shape,
color, or design of the product.' Registration of a trademark is not a prerequisite

for recovery under section 43(a)?

However, the test for infringement -

the

likelihood of confusion - is the same for both trade dress and trademark infringe-

ment.'.
C. Conflicting FederalAppellate Court Decisions
1. In re Owens-Coming FiberglasCorp.
The first United States Court of Appeals case to examine whether color alone
affords protection under the Lanham Act was In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas
Corp.37 In that case, Owens-Corning had colored its fiberglass insulation "pink,"
rather than leaving the insulation its natural yellow color. 8 To encourage the public
to identify pink insulation with Owens-Coming, Owens-Coming engaged in extensive
promotion and advertising, including a campaign which used the "Pink Panther"
cartoon character?
After several years of continuous sales of the pink insulation, Owens-Coming
applied to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to register pink as
a trademark.4 The Trademark Examiner denied the application, and Owens-Coming
appealed to the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board (the Board).4 ' The Board
affirmed the Examiner's denial of a trademark;42 however, on appeal the United

sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another
person ....
...shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is
likely to be damaged by such act.
Id.
32. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 18, at 55.
33. Other forms of unfair competition include false designation of origin and false description or
representation. See, e.g., Can-Am Eng'g Co. v. Henderson Glass, Inc., 814 F.2d 253, 254 (6th Cir. 1987)
(deciding claims of false designation of origin and false description or representation).
34. See NutraSweet v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d 1024, 1027 n.7 (7th Cir. 1990).
35. New West Ccrp. v. NYM Co., 595 F.2d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 1979); see also Metric &
Multistandard Components Corp. v. Metric's, Inc., 635 F.2d 710, 714 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding a mark
may be entitled to unfair competition protection regardless of whether it is registered as a trademark).
36. See, e.g., Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 888 F.2d 609, 616 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying
likelihood of confusion to action for trade dress infringement); New West Corp., 595 F.2d at 1201
(holding test for trademark and trade dress infringement is likelihood of confusion). For discussion of
trademark and unfair competition, see generally MCCARTHY, supra note 2.
37. 774 F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
38. In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1195, 1196 (T.T.A.B. 1984), rev'd
774 F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
39. Id. at 1198-99.
40. Id.at 1196.
41. Id.
42. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol49/iss1/8

19961

NOTES

States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed.43
The Federal Circuit acknowledged that at common law, prior to the passage of the
Lanham Act, courts did not consider color susceptible of trademark protection."
However, the court concluded that because the Lanham Act had expanded the
categories of potential marks, a manufacturer could register color per se.4 Further,
the court used a two-step analysis to determine whether Owens-Coming's pink
satisfied the other requirements of trademark protection. First, the court found that
the color pink served a strictly nonfunctional purpose for the insulation." The
Federal Circuit explained that "the color 'pink' has no utilitarian purpose, does not
deprive competitors of any reasonable right or competitive need, and is not barred
'
from registration on the basis of functionality."47
Second, the court determined that the color pink had acquired secondary meaning
and consequently indicated Owens-Coming as the source of the insulation. The
Owens-Coming court considered factors such as the amount of advertising dollars
spent to promote the pink insulation, the length of time Owens-Coming had
continuously used the color pink to identify its insulation, and survey evidence which
9
demonstrated that the public associated pink insulation with Owens-Coming.
Judge Bissell dissented from the majority, complaining that the majority had
deviated from the traditional rule that the overall color of a product could not be a
0
trade identity designation, nor was it entitled to trademark protection." Judge Bissell
offered four reasons to deny trademark protection for color alone. First, consistency
and predictability required deference to prior court decisions that had not recognized
protection of a color.5" Lawyers had advised clients and clients had conducted their
affairs in light of the traditional rule.52 Thus, Judge Bissell believed that discarding
53
the established jurisprudence would have a divisive effect on trademark law.
Second, Judge Bissell determined that because the law currently protected the use
of color as an element of a trademark there was no need to establish a new rule for
the Federal Circuit and, thus, create a division of the law among the United States
43. h re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The administrative
process for obtaining trademark protection first requires application to the PTO. If the application is in
sufficient form, it is referred to a trademark examiner. The applicant may appeal to the Trademark Trial
and Appeals Board upon rejection of the application. See MCCARTHY, supra note 2,§ 19.40, at 19-214
to -216. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit hears appeals from the Board. See,
e.g., In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1985). For discussion of the
administrative procedure, see generally MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 19.
44. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1118.
45. Id. at 1119-20.
46. Id. at 1122.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1127-28.
49. Owens-Coming spent more than $42 million advertising its pink insulation over a thirty-year
period. Id. at 1125. Further, a consumer survey conducted in 1981 showed that fifty percent of male
homeowners questioned identified Owens-Coming as the manufacturer of pink insulation. Id. at 1127.
50. Id. at 1128 (Bissell, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 1129 (Bissell, J., dissenting).
52. Id. (Bissell, J., dissenting).
53. Id. (Bissell, J., dissenting).
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courts of appeal.' Third, trademark protection for color alone might create market
dominance by one manufacturer and, therefore, bar new entrants into the market."
For example, Judge Bissell explained that if a color becomes synonymous with a
certain product, a competitor may be unable to compete in the market if prevented
from using that same color. ' Finally, Judge Bissell concluded that trademark
protection for a color would result in problems of shade confusion."
2. NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp.
Five years after the Federal Circuit's decision in Owens-Coming, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reached a contrary result in NutraSweet Co.
v. Stadt Corp.5 In NutraSweet, Stadt began selling a sugar substitute named "Sweet
'N Low" in 1958 and packaged the substitute in pink packets to distinguish it from
sugar 9 In 1982, NutraSweet began to sell its own sugar substitute, "Equal," in blue
packets.' Subsequently, in 1988, Stadt introduced another sugar substitute, "Sweet
One," which it packaged in blue, albeit a different shade than the "Equal" packet.6
NutraSweet brought a trade dress infringement action against Stadt, contending the
packets were confusingly similar. NutraSweet claimed that the product's trade dress
consisted of color alone.' The court agreed, "NutraSweet's action for trade-dress
infringement did not include any logos, designs or other markings on its 'Equal'
packets."' Thus, the NutraSweet court addressed whether the Lanham Act provides
trade dress protection for mere color.' Although a trade dress infringement case,
the Seventh Circuit determined that there was no substantive legal difference between
trade dress and trademark and cited trademark cases in resolving the issue of
protection against NutraSweet.'
In denying NutraSweet's claim for trade dress infringement, the NutraSweet court
found persuasive Judge Bissell's dissent in Owens-Coming. Borrowing from Judge
Bissell's analysis, the court recited four reasons for denying the claim. First, lawyers
had advised clients based upon the prevailing law in the circuit.' Second, there was
no need to change the law.67 Third, infringement actions could soon degenerate into
questions of shade confusion." Finally, "changing the law ... might create a barrier

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 1129-30 (Bissell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1130 (Bmssell, J., dissenting).
Id. (Bissell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1131 (B~ssell, J., dissenting).
917 F.2d 1024 (7th Cir. 1990).
NutraSweet, 917 F.2d at 1025.
Id,at 1026.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1027 n.f.
Id. at 1026-27.
Id. at 1027 n.7.
Id. at 1027.
Id.
Id.
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'
to otherwise lawful competition in the tabletop sweetener market."

3. Master Distributors,Inc. v. Pako Corp.
Three years following the NutraSweetdecision, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit had the opportunity to consider the protection of a color
trademark. In Master Distributors,Inc. v. Pako Corp.," the court evaluated whether
a common law color trademark was subject to an infringement action.7' In the case,
Master Distributors, Inc. (MDI) had manufactured and sold a blue leader splicing
tape used during photoprocessing. n Although leader tape was traditionally colored
black, MDI had dyed its tape blue to distinguish it from other tapes.' Subsequently,
a subsidiary of Pako began to manufacture and sell its own brand of blue leader
splicing tape. 4 Upon learning of this activity, MDI initiated an action alleging Pako
infringed its common law trademark of the color blue.7
76
The federal district court granted Pako's motion for summary judgment.
However, the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding there was no per se prohibition against
protecting color as a trademark.' The court noted, "[t]he United States Supreme
Court has never expressly denied the possibility that color can be protected as a
trademark.""8 Further, the court expressly rejected the three traditional arguments
against mere color protection - the color depletion theory," shade confusion,' and
the functionality doctrine."
III. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.
A. The Facts
Qualitex Co. began manufacturing and selling various products for dry cleaners,
laundries, and garment manufacturers in 1945.' One such product was a press pad,
a long pad that fits over the steel steam-delivering plate of a commercial steam
press." Qualitex named the press pad "Sun Glow."' Since 1970, Qualitex used a
69. Id. at 1028.
70. 986 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1993).
71. Id. at 221.
72. Id. at 220.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 220-21.
76. Master Distribs., Inc. v. Pako Corp., 777 F. Supp. 744 (D. Minn. 1991), rev'd, 986 F.2d 219 (8th
Cir. 1993).
77. Master Distribs., 986 F.2d at 221.
78. Id.
79. The color depletion theory assumes that there are a limited number of colors and granting rights
in one color will deplete the number of available colors to manufacturers. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
80. Shade confusion involves the difficulty of distinguishing between similar color shades. See
discussion infra Part IV.A.
81. Master Distribs., Inc. v. Pako Corp., 986 F.2d 219, 223 (8th Cir. 1993). The functionality
doctrine prevents trademark protection of a feature that serves a utilitarian purpose. See infra text
accompanying notes 99-101.
82. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1457, 1457 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
83. Id. The various components of the pads are: a heavy cover cloth, typically colored, made of a
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green-gold cover cloth on its pad." In 1989, Jacobson Products Co., a long-time
competitor of Qualitex, decided to extend its product line and began manufacturing
press pads.' To compete fairly with Qualitex, who was considered the leading
manufacturer of quality press pads in the United States, Jacobson sought to obtain

identical component parts for its press pads as those used by QualitexY Additionally, Jacobson used the same green-gold cover cloth as that used by Qualitex because
the cloth was of a high quality, was very durable, and the color was popular.8
Qualitex registered the green-gold color for use on press pads as a trademark in
1991.' That same year, Qualitex sued Jacobson for trademark infringement." The

federal district court entered judgment for Qualitex and enjoined Jacobson from using
the registered color." The court also held Jacobson liable for profits earned from
the infringement.' On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed, holding that the Lanham Act does not permit registration of color
alone as a trademark.93
B. The Decision
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the
Lanham Act prohibits the registration of color as a trademark.' Writing for the
Court, Justice Breyer held that the Lanham Act permits the registration of a
trademark "that consists, purely and simply, of a color.'"" The Court found no
theoretical objection to the use of color alone as a trademark where that color has

durable yam able to withstand high temperatures, an interior comprised of a slab of foam rubber and a
slab of fiberglass, aid a bottom cloth, usually lighter and less durable than the cover cloth but heat
resistant. Brief for Respondent at 2, Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995) (No.
93-1577).
84. Qualitex,21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1457. In 1959, Qualitex registered the name "Sun Glow" as
a trademark. ld. at 145F.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Brief for Respondent at 4, Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995) (No.
93-1577). It should be noted that the case did not involve any patent issues.
88. 1d Jacobson dtcided to call the press pad "Magic Glow." Id.
89. The PTO perm ts trademark registration of color alone if: (1) the color is distinctive, (2) the
color serves no competitive need in the industry, and (3) the color is not functional. U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRtADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINATION PROCEDUREs § 1202.04(e), at 1202-13
(2d ed. 1993).
90. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1302 (1995). This action was joined to
an original action for trade dress infringement under section 43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1995). Id.
91. Qualitex, 21 US.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1462. The district court also enjoined further trade dress
infringement. Id.
92. Id.
93. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 13 F.3d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1300
(1995). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the trade dress infringement claim. Id. at 1300.
94. "The question in this case is whether the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946 .... 15 U.S.C. §§
1051-1127 .... permit; the registration of a trademark that consists, purely and simply, of a color."
Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1302.
95. Id.
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attained secondary meaning and thus distinguishes the source of a particular
product.' Justice Breyer explained the basic purposes of trademark law are to
encourage quality production, while discouraging competitors from selling inferior
products by capitalizing on a consumer's inability to quickly evaluate a product's
quality.' The Court emphasized that "the source-distinguishing ability of a mark not its .. status as color, shape, fragrance, word, or sign - . permits it to serve
these basic purposes." 8
Additionally, the Court rejected the functionality doctrine as an absolute bar to
the use of color as a mark.' The Court explained that under the functionality
doctrine ."aproduct feature is functional,' and cannot serve as a trademark, 'if it is
essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the
article ... .""' However, the Court recognized that sometimes color is not
essential to a product's use or purpose and does not affect its cost or quality.''
The Court also rejected two other traditional objections to the use of color as a
trademark - shade confusion and color depletion.'" Rather, the Court found these
objections insufficiently persuasive to justify a blanket prohibition. The Court
explained that trial courts should address shade confusion and color depletion on a
case-by-case basis."'3 Further, the Court questioned pre-Lanham Act case law
suggesting color could not constitute a trademark and noted that the Lanham Act
"significantly changed and liberalized the common law to 'dispense with mere
technical prohibitions . ... ,""' Finally, the Court rejected the argument that there
is no need to permit color alone to function as a trademark because color maintains
protection as part of a trademark or trade dress. 5 The Court instead found that
because trademark law affords more protection than trade dress protection, for
instance, a competitor may prefer color protection alone rather than protection as part
of a design."H

96. Id. at 1303. "The law thereby 'encourage[s] the production of quality products' . . . and
simultaneously discourages those who hope to sell inferior product .... It is the source-distinguishing
ability of a mark - not its ontological status as color, shape, fragrance, word, or sign - that permits
it to serve these basic purposes." Id. at 1303-04 (quoting I J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2.0112], 2-3 (3d ed. 1994)).
97. Id. at 1304.
98. Id.

99. Id.
100. Id. (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982)).
101. Id. at 1304. "'In general terms, a product feature is functional,' and cannot serve as a trademark,

'if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article...
Id. (quoting Inwood Labs., 456 U.S. at 850 n.10).

102. Id. at 1305-06.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1307 (quoting S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946)).

105. Id. at 1308.
106. Id. "[A] firm might want to use color, pure and simple, instead of color as part of a
design ....
Trademark law helps the holder of a mark in many ways that 'trade dress' protection
does not." Id.; see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1994) (ability to prevent importation of confusingly
similar goods); id. § 1072 (constructive notice of ownership); id. § 1065 (incontestable status); id.
§ 1057(b) (prima facie evidence of validity and ownership).
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IV.Analysis
A. Shade Problems
In Qualitex, defendant Jacobson argued that permitting use of a color as a
trademark would produce uncertainty and unresolvable legal disputes about what
shades of a color a competitor may lawfully use." Jacobson added that differences
in lighting and human perceptions would cause competitors and courts to suffer from
"shade confusion" as they attempted to decide whether use of a similar color confuses
customers and ultimately results in infringement.
Indeed, several courts have found Jacobson's argument compelling. For example,
in NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp.," the Seventh Circuit predicted that "infringement
actions could soon degenerate into questions of shade confusion.""' The facts of
NutraSweet provide a vivid example of the problems with shade confusion."'
NutraSweet does not contend that the color blue of the "Sweet One"
packet is identical to the color blue of the "Equal" packet, but rather,
based upon market research, that the shades of blue are confusingly
similar. How different do the colors have to be? Under NutraSweet's
proposed test, the only way to answer that question is through
litigation."'
The dissenting judge in In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp."' likewise cited
shade confusion as a reason to bar trademark protection for a color."' Moreover,
the Owens-Coming dissent noted further a problem with shade confusion:
"Considering that registrations are printed only in black and white ....and have only
code linings for color (pink and red [indicated] the same), registration will add only
greater imprecision."" 4 In other words, the application for trademark registration
does not allow an applicant to designate a specific color shade; rather, the application
provides only for the designation of one of the primary colors listed."'
The Supreme Court in Qualitex, nonetheless, rejected shade confusion as a reason
for barring trademark protection of a color."' The Court recognized that judges
routinely decide quite difficult questions about whether two words or phrases or
symbols are sufficiently similar to confuse buyers."' Indeed, lower courts are
107. Qualiter, 115 S. Ct. at 1305.
108. 917 F.2d 1024 (7th Cir. 1990). See discussion supra Part.1l.C.2.
109. Id. at 1027 (cuoting In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1131 (Fed. Cir.
1985)); see also Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85, 97 n.20 (S.D. Iowa 1982) (holding
"practical problems ... lend credence to the 'shade confusion' rationale for denying protection of color
under the Lanham Act"), affid, 721 F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1983).
110. Nutrasweet, 917 F.2d at 1027.
111. Id.
112. 774 F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Bissell, J.,
dissenting). See discussion supra Part II.C.I.
113. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1131.
114. Id. (citing 37 C.F.R. § 2.52(e) (1993)).
115. See infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
116. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1305_
117. Id."They have to compare, for example, such words as 'Bonamine' and 'Dramamine' (motion-
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commonly called upon to decide whether two colors are similar in cases where a
trademark consists of a color and a design."
Furthermore, some commentators agree with the Supreme Court and argue that
although the determination of the differences between shades of color, or between
colors themselves, may be difficult, this often amounts to no more than determining
the differences between word marks or graphic marks that are very similar." 9
Frequently, courts are required to determine likelihood of confusion in infringement
actions with respect to all kinds of marks."' This argument suggests that the
determination of likelihood of confusion caused by two colors is no different. Of
course, confusion is the essence of an infringement claim; therefore, under this
analysis, infringement actions should "degenerate" into questions of confusion.'
However, by dismissing the importance of shade confusion, the Supreme Court
failed to recognize inevitable practical problems with the above reasoning. Ironically,
Amsted Industries, Inc. v. West Coast Wire Rope & Rigging, Inc.," a case which
the Qualitex Court cited as an example of prior judicial determination of color
similarity in a trademark design, perfectly illustrates these problems." In Amstead,
West Coast Wire (WCW), a rope manufacturer, sought trademark registration for its
wire rope, describing the mark as consisting of one green strand and one yellow
strand forming a structural part of the rope. 4 Amsted, a competitor, opposed the
registration on the grounds that WCW's green and yellow striped rope resembled
Amsted's own wire rope which had two adjacent yellow strands; thus, Amsted
claimed that WCW's rope would deceive or confuse customers." Both Amsted and
WCW failed to introduce actual samples of their products into evidence, relying
instead on photographs."n These photographs were of such poor quality that the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (the Board) could not determine the actual shade
of the colors.
The Board noted that the absence of any reliable evidence as to the colors was a
consequence of existing rules and practices in the registration of color marks."
These rules require the applicant to designate colors on the registration application
by using various patterns of lines. 9 The rules do not provide a method to specify
sickness remedies); 'Huggies' and 'Dougies' (diapers); 'Cheracol and 'Syrocol' (cough syrup); 'Cyclone'
and 'Tornado' (wire fences) and 'Mattres' and 'l-800-Mattres' (mattress franchiser telephone numbers)."

Id.
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., Michael B. Landau, Trademark Protectionfor Color Per Se After Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Products Co.: Another Grey Area in the Law, 2 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 1 (1995) (analyzing Ninth

Circuit decision).
120. Id. at 14.
121. Id.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1755 (T.T.A.B. 1987).
See Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1305.
Amsted, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1756.
Id.
Id. at 1758.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1759-60. The Rule of Practice setting forth the various linings and their color equivalents
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particular color shades or hues apart from the colors designated on the application. 3 Further, in judicial proceedings held to determine likelihood of
confusion, the court is required to consider the marks as presented for registration,
rather than the marks as they appear in the marketplace, unless the parties present
actual samples of their marks.'
Therefore, lacking actual samples from the parties, the Board in Amsted had to
decide the likelihood of confusion based on the registration application alone.
Because the shade of green can vary greatly, the Board presumed it might be
yellowish-green.' Thus, the Board concluded that confusion was likely between
Amsted's rope, containing two adjacent yellow strands, and WCW's rope, containing
adjacent yellow and green strands.'33
Based on its experience in Amsted, the Board expressed dissatisfaction with the
present procedure for designating colors in trademark applications and questioned
whether it is adequate for contemporary needs." The Board additionally noted that
in Owens-Coming the Federal Circuit expressed confidence in the Board's ability to
exercise judgment in determining shade confusion questions.'35 However, the Board
suggested that, in light of the difficulty illustrated in Amsted, the Federal Circuit
might have misplaced its confidence."s
In addition to the evidentiary problems in shade confusion cases just discussed,
other complications may arise when the color as it appears in the marketplace varies
greatly. For example, in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Tallman Conduit Co., 37
also favorably cited in Qualitex, the Board had to evaluate the likelihood of confusion
between two trademarks. 3 Youngstown's registered mark consisted of a band of
orange paint applied to its metal pipe. 3 Tallman sought to register a mark
consisting of a band of gold paint applied to its bituminous fiber sewer pipe. "
The Board held that confusion was likely because both orange and gold are
combinations of red and yellow.' Further, the Board found the color orange can
vary in hue, saturation, and brilliance.'42 In fact, Youngstown's evidence showed

is codified in 37 C.F.R. § 2.52(e) (1995). Certain linings are usable for two different colors. The colors
are red or pink, brown, blue, gray or silver, violet or purple, green, orange, and yellow or gold. 37
C.F.R. § 2.52(e) (1995). When one of the dual-color linings (such as the one for violet or purple) is used,
the word description of the mark accompanying the drawing controls the determination of which of the
colors is intended. Id § 2.35.
130. Amsted, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1760.
131. Id. at 1758 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Missouri Rolling Mill Corp., 133 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 661 (T.T.A.B. 1962)).
132. Id. at 1760.

133. Id. at 1762.
134. Id. at 1762 n.9
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id.
149 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 656 (T.T.A.B. 1966).
See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1305 (1995).
Youngstown, 149 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 657.
Id.
Id. at 657-58.
Id.
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that its color mark varied greatly in the use and advertising of its pipe from deep
reddish orange to light orange.'43 Thus, the Board concluded that light orange is
virtually indistinguishable from gold and refused to register Tallman's gold mark.'"
Such an outcome, however, seems unreasonable considering the difference between
the two colors.
The problems evident in Amsted and Youngstown could have easily occurred in
a case such as Qualitex. Qualitex had registered its green-gold mark as a trademark.
The trademark application required Qualitex to designate the mark as either green or
as yellow or gold (yellow and gold are indicated by marking the same code lining).
Thus, Qualitex could not have specified the specific green-gold shade. Further,
Qualitex could have used the color in varying shades in the marketplace from mostly
green to mostly gold. Thus, competitors such as Jacobson would not have been able
to determine which specific shade was subject to trademark protection.
In addition, a court could have an extremely difficult time deciding if a competitor's shade infringed Qualitex's green-gold. For example, if a court had the black
and white trademark application and samples of varying shades of green-gold used
by Qualitex, a court could conclude that a competitor's yellowish-green infringes on
Qualitex's green-gold because both colors contain yellow and green. Thus, a
competitor may not be able to use a color that is clearly distinguishable from the
trademark color. In light of the problems evident in Amsted and Youngstown, the
Supreme Court's disregard of shade confusion neglects the actual problems courts and
competitors will face under the Qualitex holding.
B. Limiting Available Colors
The defendant in Qualitex also argued that color depletion should bar trademark
protection for color alone. The basis of the color depletion theory is that there are
a limited number of colors. 4 Thus, granting rights in one color will deplete the
number of colors available to other manufacturers.'" Because the use of color for
marketing a product is important in any industry, limiting a manufacturer's use to
only a few colors is clearly anticompetitive.
In Diamond Match Co. v. Saginaw Match Co., 47 the Sixth Circuit relied on color
depletion to deny trademark rights for the color of a match head. The court stated
"[t]he primary colors, even adding black and white, are but few. If two of these
colors can be appropriated for one brand of tipped matches, it will not take long to
appropriate the rest."'48 Additionally, the court determined that potential entrants
into the market would be unable to sell a product when competitors have spoken for
all the available colors.'49 Similarly, in Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour & Co., 5

143. Id.at 658.
144. Id.
145. See Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour & Co., 175 F.2d 795, 798 (3d Cir. 1949).

146. Id.
147. 142 F. 727 (6th Cir. 1906).

148. Id.at 729.
149. 1L at 730.
150. 175 F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1949).
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the Third Circuit refused to protect the red and white color of Campbell's labels
based on the color depletion theory. The court reasoned that "[i]f [Campbell] may
thus monopolize red in all of its shades the next manufacturer may monopolize
orange in all its shades and the next yellow in the same way. Obviously, the list of
colors will soon run out."'5'
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court in Qualitex rejected the color depletion theory.
The Court found the theory to be unpersuasive because it relies on an occasional
problem to justify a blanket prohibition.'5 Citing Owens-Corning, the Court stated,
"[w]hen a color serves as a mark, normally alternative colors will likely be available
for similar use by others."'5 3 The Court further observed that the functionality
doctrine would provide an adequate safeguard against the anticompetitive concerns
that might arise in the case where alternate colors were not available.
The functionality doctrine ...forbids the use of a product's feature
as a trademark where doing so will put a competitor at a significant
disadvantage because the feature is "essential to the use or purpose of
the article" or "affects [its] cost or quality." The upshot is that, where
color serves a significant nontrademark function . . .courts will
examine whether its use as a mark would permit one competitor (or
a group) to interfere with legitimate (non-trademark related) competition through actual or potential exclusive use of an important
product ingredient. . . .But, ordinarily, it should prevent the anticompetitive consequences of Jacobson's hypothetical "color depletion"
argument .... "
Several commentators agree with the Supreme Court's disregard of the color
depletion theory. One commentator has argued that there is not an easily exhaustible
supply of colors: "Hundreds of color pigments are manufactured and thousands of
colors can be obtained by mixing hues with each other . . . .,,"Similarly, the
Master Distributors,Inc. v. Pako Corp." court found that a color atlas contained
names and samples of 1266 colors.
In Qualitex, however, Jacobson argued that only some colors are usable for a
particular product. 5 Jacobson further claimed that because competitors will have
to discard colors they cannot use without risking infringement of a similar shade,
only a handful of possible colors will remain available for use. 9 Although the
Court found no merit in this argument, it is clearly logical. The ordinary person can

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 798.
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1306 (1995).
Id.
Id. at 1306-07. (citations omitted).
Id. at 1305.
986"F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 223.
Qualitex, 115 S Ct. at 1305.
Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol49/iss1/8

19961

NOTES

only distinguish a few basic color shades."m Although scientific methods can
accurately distinguish color shades, no method can determine whether or not the
human eye can distinguish them.'
In addition, other practical limitations in an industry may reduce the range of
colors available for a product or package. For example, only a certain number of
colors are available for children's toys because of government toxicity standards. 62
Further, consumers consider dark colors unattractive for containers of many food
products such as milk and ice cream: "Dark-colored packages tend to look used,
and,, people do not want to buy goods that look as if they have been handled a
lot. 161
Another consideration in color depletion is that consumers may examine products
and their colors either side by side or individually."6 Because a person's ability
to remember a color individually is less precise than in a side by side analysis of
two products, the range of colors taken up by products individually presented will
be greater." In NutraSweet, a further illustration of the color depletion problem,
the Equal package description was "greenish-blue" while the Sweet One package
color description was "reddish-blue."'" A survey showed fifty percent of those
questioned confused the two colors. 7 This survey suggests that a consumer will
confuse a broader range of colors than merely the precise protected color, thus
limiting the number of available colors for competitors to use." Therefore, the
number of useable colors is greater than the traditional "few primary" colors but
clearly is not as large as the Supreme Court and some commentators suggest."
Professor J. Thomas McCarthy, a well-known author on trademark law, has
criticized those who would reject the color depletion theory because of the
abundance of useful colors: "Some courts blithely assume that because there are
hundreds of scientifically identifiable shades, consumers can distinguish between
them . . . and that therefore colors will never be 'depleted'."'7 McCarthy considers
this to be a "naive view.''. This view erroneously assumes that the first com-

160. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 7.1612], at 7-70.
161. Id. § 7.1612], at 7-72.
162. Craig Summerfield, Color as a Trademark and the Mere Color Rule: The Circuit Split for
ColorAlone, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 973, 996 (1993).
163. Id. at 997.
164. American Home Prods. Corp. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 656 F. Supp. 1058, 1064 (D.N.J. 1987), affd,
834 F.2d 368 (3d Cir. 1987) (considering the worst case situation of the products being examined singly
and independent of each other in case for trade dress infringement of pill).
165. Summerfield, supra note 162, at 996.
166. Id. (citing Brief for Appellee at 18, NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d 1024 (7th Cir.

1990)).
167. Id.(citing Evidence for Appellant, NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d 1024 (7th Cir.
1990)).
168. Id.
169. Id. (quoting Brian R. Henry, Right History, Wrong Peg: In re Owens-Coming Fiberglass
Corporationand the Demise of the Mere Color Rule, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 389, 403 (1986)).
170. MCCARTHY, supranote 2,§ 7.1612], at 7-7 1.
171. Id.
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petitor in a market to use a primary color such as "red" as its distinguishing color
will not sue when a competitor enters the same market with red, based on the junior
user's argument that its "yellowish-red" is not confusingly similar to the senior user's
"bluish-red."'" In reality, the senior user of red will surely attempt to protect its
mark by suing the junior use for its use of yellowish-red.
Finally, one commentator noted that "[a]ll that it takes to erode the color
depletion theory is a quick trip to any paint store, hardware store, or art supply
store."'" Presumably, it would take a very long time to exhaust all of the color
choices." However, anyone who has been unable to distinguish between fine
variations of shades in a paint store will clearly appreciate the real problem when
a judge or juror is asked to determine whether "yellowish red" infringes "bluish
75
red.'
C. FosteringAnticompetition
According to the legislative history of the Lanham Act, trademark statutes serve
three purposes: (1) "to protect the public from deceit, (2) to foster fair competition,
and (3) to secure to the business community the advantages of reputation and good
will . .,."7 In interpreting the Lanham Act, courts have struggled to balance the
conflicting goals of consumer protection and the maintenance of good will and
reputation of a business with the interference in legitimate competition. The dissent
in Owens-Coming found that "the 'property' in a trademark is the right to prevent
confusion, not to bar new entrants into the market."'" Further, in support of the
procompetitive theme, the Second Circuit in Wallace InternationalSilversmiths, Inc.
v. GodingerSilver Art Co.'78 noted, "[i]t is a first principal of trademark law that
an owner may not use the mark as a means of excluding competitors from a
substantial market." 79
In Qualitex, Jacobson unsuccessfully argued that color is the "most vital human
sense."' Jacobson claimed that "color is one of the few modes of communication
which touches all but the few who cannot experience it."'8 ' Because "color plays
a dramatic role in the marketplace today," Jacobson explained that it would be

172. lId
173. Landau, supra note 119, at 10.
174. Id
175. MCCARTHY, si'pra note 2, § 7.16[2], at 7-71.
176. Brief for Respcndent at 16, Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995) (No.
93-1577) (quoting S. Rup. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 4 (1946), reprinted in 1946
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275)).
177. In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Bissell, J.,
dissenting).
178. 916 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1990).
179. Id. at 81.
180. Respondents' Brief at 18, Qualitex (No. 93-1577) (citing Brief Amicus Curiae of Dr.
Pepper/Seven-Up Corporation, at 10).
181. Id.
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inappropriate and anticompetitive to grant any manufacturer of any pqoduct a
complete monopoly for any particular color for their product."
The Supreme Court contemplated the effect on competition of allowing trademark
protection for a color but nonetheless dismissed Jacobson's claims that such
protection would be anticompetitive: "Although it is important to use some color
on press pads to avoid noticeable stains, the [Ninth Circuit] . . . found 'no
competitive need in the press pad industry for the green-gold color, since other
colors are equally usable.""' By mixing the functionality doctrine and competitive
need, the Supreme Court found that courts will examine whether a color's use as a
mark would permit one competitor to interfere with legitimate competition through
exclusive use of an important product ingredient - color."
In NutraSweet,however, the Seventh Circuit found that protection of color alone
might create a barrier to otherwise lawful competition." NutraSweet had urged
the court to adopt a fact-driven standard, such as that adopted by the Supreme Court
in Qualitex.' This standard would require the trial court to determine the number
of competitors and the likelihood of future competitors in the market to determine
whether there is a competitive need for the color blue to remain available.'
Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit correctly rejected this standard. That court feared
that such a standard "would prove unworkable, for there is no way for a court to
predict the likelihood of future competitors in a particular market."" Contrary to
the Qualitex Court, the NutraSweet court further recognized such a standard's effect
on competition:
It is likely, however, that if each of the competitors presently in the
tabletop sweetener market were permitted to appropriate a particular
color for its product, new entrants would be deterred from entering the
market. The essential purpose of trademark law is to prevent confusion,
not to bar new entrants into the market."
Moreover, the NutraSweet court observed that, without monopolizing a color,
NutraSweet could seek protection through an unfair competition claim under the
Lanham Act if a competitor tried to pass off its goods as those of NutraSweet."
In her Owens-Coming dissent, Judge Bissell gave an excellent example of how
trademark protection of a color alone might bar new entrants into the market. 9

182. Id. at 19.
183. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1305 (1995) (quoting district court
finding, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1457, 1460 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (accepted by Ninth Circuit)).
184. Id. at 1306.
185. NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d 1024, 1028 (7th Cir. 1990).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Bissell, J.,
dissenting).
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She reasoned that due to the dominance of Owens-Corning in the field, pink
insulation had become virtually synonymous with home insulation." Thus, if
barred from making pink insulation, new entrants would be unable to effectively
compete.193 In fact, the record revealed the extent of Owens-Corning's domination
of the field stating "some shoppers will no longer buy fiberglass insulation unless
it is pink.""'
Indeed, the Owens-Corning market situation is remarkably similar to the market
situation in Qualiter.Nonetheless, the Supreme Court neglected to address the fact
that trademark protection of a color could bar new entrants into a market. Qualitex
had manufactured a green-gold press pad for more than thirty years. Further,
Qualitex was arguably the leading manufacturer of quality press pads in the United
States. To compete fairly in the press pad market, Jacobson sought to use the same
green-gold cover cloth for its own press pad. However, the unfortunate result of the
Supreme Court's anticompetitive holding is that Jacobson might be barred from
successful entry into the press pad market.
V. Recommendation to Limit Shade Confusion Problems
It is inevitable that color depletion and shade confusion problems will result from
trademark protection of color alone. However, federal legislation could prevent at
least some of the shade confusion problems. Congress could easily revise the
existing rules regarding trademark registration. Currently, registration applications
appear in black and white and merely have eight separate code linings for
colors." 5 Further, of the eight code linings, four are dual linings which indicate
either of two colors, such as red or pink." Registration does not provide a means
of specifying particular shades or hues different from the primary colors listed on
the application. To avoid problems with what will surely be an increase in color
trademark infringement suits, Congress should modify the rules to allow precise
color registration. The application section that provides for color designation could
be printed in color," Additionally, the section could contain a broad range of
shades for each primary color currently listed. Thus, the applicant could more
precisely indicate its color mark. Although this recommendation will not solve all
the problems of shade confusion, courts and competitors will at least know which
particular shade has trademark protection.
VI. Conclusion
The consequences of the Qualitex decision will be significant. In addition to the
problems with shade confusion and color depletion and the negative effect on

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
decrease

lit(Bissell, J., dissenting).
Id. (Bissell, J.,
dissenting).
Id. (Bissell, J.,
dissenting) (quoting the record).
37 C.F.R. § 2.52(e) (1995). See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
37 C.F.R. § 2.52(e) (1995).
The increased cost of printing color applications will surely be far more than offset by the
in litigation cos.s.
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competition, Qualitex will encourage owners of trademarks that consist simply of
color to quickly register those marks. Therefore, companies formerly relegated to
trade dress infringement claims will now likely sue for trademark infringement as
well. However, because a color is inherently nondistinctive,'98 companies seeking
to obtain trademark rights in a color will have to promote the color mark as an
identifier of the product source until the mark has acquired secondary meaning. In
Owens-Coming, for example, Owens-Coming spent more than $42 million
advertising its pink insulation over a thirty-year period."9 Thus, manufacturers
who can afford to may have to spend large amounts of time and money to establish
secondary meaning for their color mark.
Despite the Supreme Court's flawed reasoning and the practical problems of
trademark protection of a color alone, Qualitex nonetheless succeeds in establishing
a clear rule for all circuits to follow. The Lanham Act permits the registration of
a trademark that consists of a color if: (1) the color has acquired secondary
meaning; (2) the color does not serve a utilitarian function; and (3) the color mark
meets all other requirements for trademark protection. Further, the Court in Qualitex
expressed that, except in exceptional cases, shade confusion and color depletion are
no longer valid reasons to deny trademark protection of a color.
Paige Stratton Bass

198. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
199. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1125.
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